ABSTRACT Physical layer (PHY) security is recently regarded as a promising technique to improve the security performance of wireless communication networks. Current developments in PHY security are often based on the assumption of perfect channel state information (CSI). In this paper, both security and reliability performance for the downlink cloud radio access network with optimal remote radio heads (RRHs) node selection are investigated in a practical scenario by considering channel estimation (CE) errors. In particular, a three-phase transmission scheme is proposed and the linear minimum mean-square error (MMSE) estimation method is utilized to obtain the CSI. Based on the CSI estimates and the statistics of CE errors, the outage probability and intercept probability are derived in closed-form expression to evaluate the security and reliability performance, respectively. In addition, two possible cases (with or without intercepting signals from baseband unit) are considered for the eavesdropper. It is found that the suggested optimal RRHs selection scheme outperforms the nonselection scheme, and that the increasing number of RRHs can lower the outage probability as well as the intercept probability. It is also shown that there exists an optimal training number to minimize the sum of the outage probability and intercept probability. Finally, simulation results are provided to corroborate our proposed studies.
I. INTRODUCTION
High data rate applications such as online multimedia services, cloud storage and cloud computing have grown rapidly and cause the bandwidth crunch problem on existing wireless networks [1] . Cloud radio access network (CRAN) [3] is recognized as a promising approach to solve the bandwidth crunch problem for future wireless networks. CRAN is first promoted by China Mobile Company in 2010 [4] and further studied in [5] - [7] . In a CRAN, the Remote Radio Heads (RRHs) operate the role as soft relays by compressing and forwarding the signal received from mobile users to a centralized Base Band Unit (BBU) through the backhaul links [7] . The RRH association CRAN capacity analysis in [2] shows that the larger number of RRH association balance the performance gain and implementation cost.
Due to the broadcasting nature of wireless channels and the centralizing architecture of CRAN, CRAN is vulnerable to both passive attacks (e.g. eavesdropper [1] ) and active attacks (e.g. denial-of-service attack [1] ). It need to be pointed out that the active malicious attackers transmit harmful active signal, which can be detected by the cloud with certain strategies. Comparing to the active attacker, an eavesdropper remains silent and attempts to intercept message from legitimate user equipments (UEs), which is almost impossible to be detected by the cloud.
One possible way against eavesdropper is utilizing cryptographic encryption [8] . A transmitter uses a key to encrypt the source information and share the key with legitimate UEs. Eavesdroppers hardly recover the source information without the secret key. However, the encryption method requires considerable computational resources and communication overheads, which adds another layer of complexity in the design of networks [9] .
Another new approach against eavesdropper is physical layer (PHY) security by exploiting the physical characteristics of wireless channels [9] . This work was pioneered by Wyner, who introduced the wiretap channel in 1975 and established the possibility to transmit confidential messages without using secret keys [10] . Later the security capacity is defined in [10] to measure the maximum achievable transmission rate from source to the legitimate UEs while making the amount of information leaked to the eavesdroppers negligible.
Studies about PHY security have yielded many interesting results [12] - [17] . In [15] , the security capacity in multi-input single-output multiple eavesdroppers (MISO) channel is analyzed and it is shown that the suggested beamforming strategy is capacity-achieving. The reference [16] has extended the PHY security study in [15] to multi-input multi-output (MIMO) channel. Since the use of multiple antennas on a node involves a potentially significant hardware cost, node cooperation is a low-cost alternative that enables single-antenna nodes to benefit from multiple-antenna systems. Therefore, the reference [17] studies the PHY security for the cooperative networks with three relay protocols: amplify-and-forward (AF), decodeand-forward (DF) and cooperative jamming (CJ).
One important feature for PHY security is that the CSI, including which from the source to the legitimate UE as well as from the source to the eavesdropper, should be known by the source and/or the legitimate UE to enable signal processing such as beamforming and jamming. Most of the previous research about PHY secure wireless communication have assumed perfect CSI. However, in practical communication systems, CSI is observed by estimation algorithms [24] and channel estimation (CE) error is inevitable. In general, the CE error exists at all communication nodes including RRHs, legitimate UEs in CRAN and eavesdroppers. Recently, physical layer security in the presence of imperfect CE attracts increasingly attention [18] - [20] . The impact of the legitimate UE's CE error on performance of artificial noise technique is studied in [18] and it is shown that the ergodic secrecy rate decreases with increasing CE errors. The imperfect CSI at the legitimate UE is considered in [19] to analyze the optimal power allocation for artificial noise. In [20] , joint design of training and data symbols is investigated with secrecy beamforming approach.
CE errors can also degrade the reliability performance of wireless communication networks [21] , e.g., the outage probability of the main link (channel between the BBU and the legitimate UE) will increase with higher CE errors. It is worth noting that approaches to improve the reliability (e.g., increasing the transmit power and sending more training symbols) will degrade the level of security as they can also enhance the intercept performance of eavesdroppers. In [22] , the notion of security and reliability tradeoff is first introduced for cryptosystems and three encryption algorithms are proposed against eavesdropping. In To our best knowledge, the security and reliability performance for CRAN has not been studied in the presence of CE errors, which motivates our current work.
A. CONTRIBUTION
In this work, we proposed a three-phase transmission scheme with optimal RRH selection against eavesdropper for the CRAN in the presence of CE error. In particular, the security and reliability performance of this scheme are analyzed in the form of intercept probability (the probability that the eavesdropper successfully intercept the source message) and outage probability (the probability that the outage occurs at the legitimate UE) in the presence of CE errors.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
1) We consider Rayleigh fading channels and use intercept probability and outage probability to analyze the the performance of CRAN in the presence of CE error. This has not been studied in the previous work about PHY security [12] - [17] . 2) We propose an three-phase transmission scheme and suggest an optimal RRH selection approach for CRAN with multiple RRHs. Our analytical and numerical results show that the number of RRHs is an important parameter in determining the security performance. 3) We evaluate the tradeoff between security performance and reliability performance in designing the CRAN. The security-reliability tradeoff is derived in closed form that takes into account the influence of CE errors. 4) We also study the effects of the training (pilot) number on the security performance and reliability performance. The training utilization efficiency is defined to evaluate the overall effects of the training number in reliability performance. It is found that there exists an optimal training number to maximize the data throughput and the optimal value can be obtained through the computer simulations. The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the system model of CRAN and introduces the three-phase optimal RRH selection transmission scheme. The channel capacity of all nodes in the presence of CE error are derived in Section III. The reliability and security performance is analyzed in Section IV and Section V, respectively. In Section VI, we provide simulation results to corroborate the proposed studies. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VII.
Following notation are adopted in this paper. CN (µ, σ 2 ) denotes the circularly symmetric, complex Gaussian distribution with mean µ and variance σ 2 . E{·} denotes expectation. Ei denotes the exponential integral function.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a CRAN system consisting of one source S (the BBU), one destination D (the UE) and Q RRHs R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R Q against one eavesdropper E as depicted in Fig. 1 . Each node in the network is only equipped with a single antenna. All RRHs are subject to the halfduplex constraint, i.e., they cannot transmit and receive simultaneously. Time-division duplex (TDD) model is assumed so that the channels are reciprocal. The source and Q RRHs are connected with the cloud via backhaul links. 1 For notational convenience, the set of Q RRHs is denoted as R = {R q |q = 1, 2, . . . , Q}. The channels h ab from node a to node b are defined in Table 1 , where the subscript s denotes the source, e denotes the eavesdropper and d denotes the destination. In addition, the noise produced in the transmission on the channel h ab is denoted as w ab , which is assumed as zero mean complex Gaussian variable with variance N 0 . FIGURE 2. Three-phase transmission scheme and overview of one frame, where BBU denotes the base band unit, UE denotes the user equipment, RRHs denotes all RRH nodes and BRRH denotes the optimal/best RRH.
Suppose one frame transmitted from the source contains N symbols that consist of K training symbols p(n) and M data symbols s(n) as shown in Fig. 2 . Clearly, N = M + K . Let T p 1 The backhaul link can be both wired and wireless. In this work, the RRHs upload some bits of channel indicators to BBU. The signal leakage of backhaul link is not considered in this work.
denote the index set of the training symbols while denote T d as the index set of data symbols. The full time index set is
Due to the long distance or shadowing effects between the destination and the source, the destination cannot receive the signal directly from the source. Therefore, the RRHs are utilized by the CRAN to exchange information between the source and the destination and prevent the eavesdropper from intercepting the source message. A three-phase transmission scheme is proposed for the transmission as shown in Fig. 2 .
In the first phase, the source broadcasts with transmit power P s to RRHs the message x(n) which may be intercepted by the eavesdropper. The signal received at the qth RRH is
where h sq is the channel coefficients from the source to qth RRH, w sq is additive noise at the qth RRH and x(n) is the signal transmitted by source defined as
If the signal is intercepted by the eavesdropper, it can be given as
where f se is the channel coefficients from the source to the eavesdropper and w se is the additive noise at the eavesdropper. Let the set D represent those RRHs that succeed in decoding the source message x(n), which is called as decoding RRH set. For Q RRHs, there are 2 Q possible decoding subsets from the decoding RRH set R. Thus, the resultant successful decoding RRH set D is given by
where D q denotes a non-empty subset, in which q out of Q RRHs successfully decoding the source message, and ∅ represents an empty set. The decoding RRH set will be determined by channel capacities with the channel estimates. Based on (1), the decoding subset D q is given by
whereD q = R − D q is the complement of D q , R is a predefined transmission data rate for RRHs to decode the source message. Analogously, the empty set D = ∅ is described as
If the decoding set = ∅, i.e., none of the RRHs can succeed in decoding the source signal x(n), all RRHs will keep silent in the second phase. Thus the destination cannot obtain the source message from RRHs and then the outage event occurs.
In the second phase, the destination will broadcast K training symbols to RRHs with transmit power P d . The training symbols are used to estimate the channel between the destination and RRHs. By utilizing linear MMSE, all RRHs can obtain the channel estimates and then send CSI results to the cloud via backhaul links. Clearly, The signal received at the qth RRH is
where g dq is the channel coefficients from the destination to the qth RRH and w dq is the additive noise at the qth RRH. Based on the CSI estimation results, the cloud choose a RRH with the best CSI. The common method to choose the RRH can be given by
where γ qd is the instantaneous SNR. We denote the optimal RRH as R b .
In the third phase, the selected optimal RRH R b will forward the recoded source message to the destination. Suppose the total power of the optimal RRH node is P r . The signal received at the destination can be written as
where h bd is the channel coefficients from the selected RRH to the destination and w bd is the additive noise at the destination. The signal intercepted by the eavesdropper in the third phase can be expressed as
where f be is the channel coefficients from the selected RRH to the eavesdropper and w be is the additive noise at the eavesdropper. For eavesdropper, there exists two cases whether or not it intercepts the source message x(n) directly from the source. If the eavesdropper intercepts the source message x(n), then it will choose a signal copy with higher signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) to decode the source message.
III. CHANNEL CAPACITY WITH ESTIMATION ERROR
In this section, we derive the mathematical expressions for channel capacity in the presence of CE error. Both CE and data detection processes at the destination, RRHs and the eavesdropper are analyzed, respectively. We assume that all transmit nodes estimate the channel with linear MMSE estimator.
A. CHANNEL ESTIMATION AT RRHS 1) THE FIRST PHASE
The 
Multiplying both sides of the (11) with p H will give 
The mean of the channel estimateĥ sq is zero and the variance of it is
The estimation error of the channel h sq can be found as
It can be readily checked that the CE error sq is zero mean Gaussian distributed with variance
In order to detect data symbols with channel estimateĥ sq , the (1) will be rewritten as
for n ∈ T d .
Remark 1: The result given by the linear MMSE method guarantees that the CE error is uncorrelated with the channel estimate, i.e., E(ĥ
This means the interference resulted from the CE error can be translated into a sort of noise independent from the source signal [24] , which will facilitate the capacity analysis in the following part. Thus, the instantaneous SNR at qth RRH can be obtained as [24] 
From (17) and (19), we can find the channel capacity as
where L = 2M + 3K is the total symbols in a transmission frame and the factor M L in the front of log-function denotes the fact that we transmit signal in M data symbols out of total L symbols from the source to the destination via the RRH. According to the information theory [25] , when the channel capacity C sq is below a certain data rate threshold R, RRH R q is unable to decode the source signal x(n). Thus, event D = ∅ is described as where R denotes the set of Q RRHs. Similarly, event D = D q can be given by
2) THE SECOND PHASE
The RRH nodes will receive K training symbols sent by the destination and obtain CE with linear MMSE. The best RRH with highest SNR will be chosen by CRAN from those RRHs that successfully decode the source message. The estimate of R q − D channel coefficient g dq and the CE error are denoted byĝ dq and dq , respectively. Clearly,
The instantaneous SNR at RRHs can be written as
where |ĝ dq | 2 and | dq | 2 have an exponential distribution. Thus, the cloud will choose the best RRH as Best RRH = arg max
The results of channel estimatesĝ dq and their statistical characteristics are listed in Table 2 .
B. CHANNEL ESTIMATION AT THE DESTINATION
The destination receives the recoded source message from the selected RRH. The channel h bd is estimated by the linear MMSE estimator. The channel coefficientĥ bd and CE error bd are given as
Similarly, the instantaneous SNR at the destination is given as
where |ĥ bd | 2 and | bd | 2 have an exponential distribution. From (27), we can find the channel capacity of the link h bd as
The results of channel estimatesĥ bd , the CE error bd and their statistical characteristics are listed in Table 2 .
C. CHANNEL ESTIMATION AT THE EAVESDROPPER
In the three-phase transmission scheme, the eavesdropper can intercept the signal from both the source and the selected RRH or only form the selected RRH. We consider both cases:
1) The eavesdropper succeeds in intercepting both the signal from the source and the selected RRH.
2) The eavesdropper only intercepts the signal from the selected RRH.
1) INTERCEPT THE SOURCE SIGNAL (ISS)
If the eavesdropper successfully intercept the signal directly from the source in the first phase, the channel estimatef se can be found with linear MMSE and the results of channel estimatesf se , the CE error se and their statistical characteristics are listed in Table 2 . The instantaneous SNR is given by
Therefore, the channel capacity of the link h se can be given by
2) WITHOUT THE SOURCE SIGNAL (WSS)
In this case, the eavesdropper will intercept the signal from selected RRH in the third phase. The channel estimatef be , the CE error be and their statistical characteristics are listed in Table 2 . The instantaneous SNR is given by
Hence, the channel capacity of the link h be can be given by
Since the same signal processing methods are utilized at the RRH in the second phase, at the destination and the eavesdropper in the third phase, we omit the description of the signal processing progresses and only listed the results in the Table. 2 for conciseness.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF RELIABILITY
This section is focused on the outage probability analysis of the three-phase transmission scheme with the optimal RRH selection. During the RRH selection process, an outage event is considered to occur in following events:
1) The decoding set is empty, i.e., all RRHs fail to decode the source message and transmit noting to the destination.
2) The best RRH is chosen according to (8) to forward the source message to the destination, and however the destination is unable to decode the message from the RRH. Considering all cases and using the law of total probability, the outage probability of the three-phase transmission scheme with the best RRH selection can be calculated as
where the superscript R denotes the threshold of the outage event. The probability of the first part in (33) is obtained from (21) as
where κ = 2 RL/M − 1 and γ s = P s /N 0 . Noting that |ĥ sq | 2 and | sq | 2 follow exponential distribution, we can further find (34) as
With some straight mathematical evaluation, we can obtain
where Q is the number of the RRHs. Substituting (14) and (16) into (36) will get
The probability of event D = D q can be obtained as
Next, we can find Pr(C bd < R) as
where γ r = P r /N 0 . Finally, substituting (37), (38) and (39) into (33) can obtain the closed-form expression of outage probability P 
Suppose BPSK or QPSK modulation is adopted and thus p H p = K . To simplify the outage and the intercept probability, we can assume that
Hence, we can simplify (37) and (38) as
and
where |D q | and |D n | are the cardinalities of set D q andD q , respectively. Also, we can rewrite (39) as
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Substituting (42), (43) and (44) into (33) yields
Noting that when the number of RRHs Q → ∞, the outage possibility P (R) out → 0. The equation (45) represents the closed-form expression of outage probability for the optimal RRH selection scheme of CRAN.
Let us define the training utilization efficiency (TUE) as
where
out denotes the reliability of the system with K training symbols. The increasing value of the training number K will result in less data symbols M , and thus reduces channel capacity. Accordingly, the C bd × (1 − P (K ) out ) can be seen as the overall reliability performance when the training number is K . The greater value of the TUE indicates the better reliability performance of the system. Obtaining the optimal η as a function of the parameter K is challenging. Nevertheless, the optimal value of K can be obtained by the simulation results.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF SECURITY
The eavesdropper will attempt to intercept the source message from the source or the selected RRH. We consider both cases whether or not the eavesdropper can successfully intercept signals from the source.
A. WITHOUT THE SOURCE SIGNAL (WSS)
To successfully decode the source message, the channel capacity of the wiretap channel is supposed to be greater than the data rate R. Hence, the intercept probability is given as
In the case of D = D q , noticing that the best RRH is selected according to (8) , we can obtain Pr(C be > R) as
where Pr(C be < R) is given in (A.9). Substituting (38) and (48) into (47) yields the closed-form expression of P (R) int WSS . Utilizing the same approximation (40) in Section IV, the intercept probability P (R) out WSS can be given by (49), as shown at bottom of this page.
Next, combining (45) and (49), we can find
).
B. INTERCEPT THE SOURCE SIGNAL
After intercepting the two signal copies, the one with the higher SNR will be employed by the eavesdropper to decode the source message. The capacity achieved at eavesdropper can be written as
where C se and C be represent the channel capacity from the source to the eavesdropper and the channel from the best RRH to the eavesdropper respectively. To decode the source message, the channel capacity of the wiretap channel is supposed to be greater than the data rate R [23] . Hence, the intercept probability is given as
As discussed in the Subsection V-A, Pr(C se > R) can be obtained as
The closed-form expression of Pr(C e > R) is given by (A.10) in Appendix. Substituting (37), (38), (53) and (A.10) into (52), we can obtain the closed-form expression for P
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, the numerical results are presented to evaluate our studies in section III, IV and V. The transmission power of the source P s , the selected RRH P r and the destination P d are of the same value. The background noise powers at all notes are assumed to be the same, i.e., N 0 = 1. The transmission rate is set as R = 1bit/s/Hz. We define the destination to eavesdropper ratio (DER) as the ratio of channel gains, i.e. DER = 10 log 10 (σ 2 q /σ 2 e ), which denotes the degradation of the wiretap channel. We also assume each frame contains N = 1000 symbols. Fig. 3 illustrates the intercept probability of the ISS and the WSS schemes for different number of RRHs Q. The DER is set as 0 dB, σ 2 q is 2 and the training number K is 15. In the ISS scheme, the eavesdropper is able to intercept both the message from the source and the selected RRH, and it chooses and decodes the message with higher SNR. Thus, the intercept probability of the ISS scheme is typically higher than that of the WSS scheme. Furthermore, it can be observed that the intercept probability in both schemes decreases as the number of RRHs Q increases. It is worth to notice that the decreasing of intercept probability to the bottom around 3 dB and 4 dB is due to the increasing SNR which enlarges the successful decoding RRH set D. The larger successful decoding RRH set D gives a higher probability that the channel gain from the selected RRH to the destination h bd is better than that from the selected RRH to the eavesdropper h be . Thus, although the eavesdropper channel is not degraded, the RRH selection transmission could lower the intercept probability.
Further, Fig. 4 shows the intercept probability of the ISS and the WSS schemes for different DERs. The number of RRHs Q is 5, σ 2 q is 2 and the training number K is 15. We assume that two wiretap channels h se and h be are of the same DER. The degradation of the wiretap channel can significantly decrease the intercept probability. The increases in DER can narrow the gap of intercept probability between the ISS scheme and the WSS scheme. We can find from Fig. 4 that the intercept probabilities of the ISS and the WSS are merely the same when DER=10 dB. This is due to the poor condition of the wiretap channel makes interception difficult. To evaluate the security and reliability performance, the sum of the outage and the intercept probability of the ISS scheme for different number of RRHs Q versus SNR are plotted in Fig. 5 . The DER is 0 dB, σ 2 q is 2 and the training number K is 15. We can observe from Fig. 5 that when the SNR is less than −5 dB, the sum probability converges to 1, which is due to the fact that the outage probability at low SNR comes close to 1; when the SNR is greater than 25 dB, the sum probability also converges to 1, which is due to the fact that the intercept probability at high SNR comes close to 1; when the SNR is around 0 dB to 15 dB, the sum probability decreases significantly as the number of RRHs Q increases. It implies that both the security and the reliability performance of the system benefit form the selected RRH scheme.
Next, Fig. 6 depicts the training utilization efficiency versus the training number K of the ISS scheme for different number of RRHs and SNR. The DER is set as 0 dB and σ 2 q is 2. As shown in Fig. 6 , the TUE increases to a peak value when the training number K is about 15(N = 1000); and then the TUE decreases with the increase training number, which FIGURE 6. Training utilization efficiency versus the trainig number K of the ISS scheme for diferent numbers of RRH Q and SNR.
FIGURE 7.
The outage probability, the intercept probability and the sum probability of the ISS scheme verus the training number K .
is because the increasing training number will decrease the number of the data symbol and thus reduce the capacity. The outage probability, the intercept probability and the sum probability verus the training number K are plotted in Fig. 7 . The SNR is set as 5dB, the DER is set as 3dB, σ 2 q is 2 and the number of RRHs Q is 5. It can be seen from Fig. 7 that the sum of the outage probability and the intercept probability first decreases to bottom and then increases when the training number K increases. Clearly, there exist an optimal value of K so that the sum probability can be minimized, which can be numerically determined through computer simulations. Fig. 8 illustrates the security-reliability tradeoff of the WSS scheme for different number of RRHs. The DER is 5 dB, σ 2 q is 1 and the training number K is 10. The intercept probability decreases as the outage probability degrades from 10 −3 to 10 −1 , which implies the tradeoff between security and reliability. One can be seen from Fig. 8 that the intercept probability strictly degrades corresponding to different RRHs Q = 2, Q = 6 and Q = 10, showing the advantage of the exploiting the RRH selection approach to enhance the security and reliabilty of the wireless transmission. 
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the security and reliability performance for the downlink CRAN with optimal RRH selection were investigated in the presence of CE error. In particular, a three-phase transmission scheme was proposed and linear MMSE was utilized to obtain CSI. Next, the outage probability and intercept probability were derived in closed form to evaluate the security and reliability performance, respectively. For the eavesdropper, two possible schemes were studied depending on whether the signal from BBU are intercepted. It was found that the proposed optimal RRH selection scheme outperforms the non-selection scheme and that the outage probability and intercept probability both decrease with increasing number of RRHs. It was also shown that there exists an optimal training number to minimize the sum of the outage probability and intercept probability. Besides, the security and reliability tradeoff for the WSS scheme is derived to show the compromise of the two performance. Finally, simulation results were provided to corroborate the proposed scheme.
APPENDIX DERIVATION OF Pr(C e > R)
Using (51), Pr(C e > R) can be expressed as
Using the channel capacity given in Table. 2, we can find Pr(C se < R) as
Noticing that the best RRH is selected according to (8) during the second phase, Pr(C be < R) can be given by Pr(C be < R)
Lemma 1: Suppose x and y are independent random variables with exponential distribution. Let p x (x) and p y (y) denote the probability density function (PDF) of x and y respectively
Define a random variable z = x/(y + a), where a is a positive real number, i.e. a > 0. The PDF of the random variable z is
Utilizing p z (z) = dF z (z)/dz, we can obtain (A.5).
Denoting 
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